Philippa Foot’s ‘Natural Goodness’ by Gorevan, Patrick
© – Patrick Gorevan, „Philippa Foot‟s “Natural Goodness”‟, in Maynooth Philosophical Papers, Issue 
5 (2008), ed. by Simon Nolan (Maynooth: Department of Philosophy, National University of Ireland, 
Maynooth, 2009), pp. 9–15.  
 







Philippa Foot, with the help of her friend and colleague Elizabeth Anscombe, discovered that Summa 
Theologiae, II-II of Thomas Aquinas was a powerful resource in seeking objectivism in ethics. Foot‟s aim 
was to produce an ethics of natural goodness, in which moral evil, for example, came to be seen as a 
„natural defect‟ rather than the expression of a taste or preference. This brought her to develop a concrete 
ethics of virtue with a broad sweep, dealing with the individual and communal needs and goods of human 
beings, and particularly with their central moral quality of acting for a reason, with a practical rationality. 




The general topic of the seminar for which this paper was written was „Analytic 
Thomism‟: Thomistic thinking which is carried out in an analytic way.1 Perhaps it is 
closer to the point to call Philippa Foot a Thomistically influenced analytic philosopher. 
Fergus Kerr‟s recent assessment puts it well: 
For many years now, a small number of philosophers in the analytic tradition 
have been reading Aristotle, but also Thomas Aquinas, more or less obviously, in 
ways which enable them to resist, criticise and reshape the agenda in ethics. Few 
as these philosophers are, they have exercised an influence far beyond their tiny 
number. Through them, Thomas has long been an important resource, with 
some of his key ideas incorporated, anonymously or obliquely, into mainstream 
philosophy.2 
 
This is a good description of Philippa Foot‟s achievement. 
 
 I will begin by mentioning Foot‟s early development in moral philosophy, 
particularly her contact with Elizabeth Anscombe, with special mention of Anscombe‟s 
suggestion that she investigate the virtues in Aquinas. I then turn to her critique of 
subjectivism, the need to turn to the subject‟s emotions or commitment in order to turn 
„facts‟ into „values‟; and finally to her positive theory of natural, species-based goodness 
and the practical rationality which responds adequately to this.   
 
Philippa Foot and Elizabeth Anscombe 
It is clear that Philippa owed a philosophical debt to Elizabeth Anscombe, and that debt 
could be summed up in the word „influence‟. Or perhaps we also need the word 
„friendship‟ to do justice to it. As a philosopher from a rather different tradition put it in 
1997:  
It must not be forgotten that reason too needs to be sustained in all its searching 
by trusting dialogue and sincere friendship. A climate of suspicion and distrust, 
which can beset speculative research, ignores the teaching of the ancient 
                                                 
1 „Analytic Thomism‟ Seminar organised by Cairde Thomais Naofa in National University of Ireland, 
Maynooth, 12 April 2008. 
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philosophers who proposed friendship as one of the most appropriate contexts 
for sound philosophical enquiry.3 
These words from Fides et Ratio underline John Paul II‟s conviction that every man is 
seeking the answers to the important questions in life, but that he does not undertake this 
search alone. Philippa Foot‟s friendship with Elizabeth Anscombe and their 
conversations on ethics and other areas have marked her thinking. 
 Philippa Foot (originally Bosanquet) was born in 1920, grand-daughter of US 
President Grover Cleveland. She was one of the founders of Oxfam, and a 
contemporary, friend and disciple of Elizabeth Anscombe at Oxford in the 40s, from 
whom she received a spur to her subsequent development from Anscombe, whom she 
always cites as a major influence, and in a recent interview declared one of the very best 
philosophers of our time.4 Foot had come from a non-bookish environment, indeed had 
no formal education as a child, simply a series of governesses. One of these finally 
suggested to her that she would be able to get to university, and so she put in for some 
correspondence courses and ended up being accepted by Somerville College Oxford, 
where she was a contemporary of the philosopher-novelist Iris Murdoch, who has 
written a memoir of her from those years. 
 Mary Midgely‟s recent autobiography, The Owl of Minerva, describes the lifestyle of 
the postwar Somerville College and the dedication to philosophical conversation which 
marked the group around Elizabeth Anscombe and Iris Murdoch there. 5  Issues like 
rudeness, talkativeness, promise-making, and the like came to the fore. Foot herself 
speaks of her lunch-time conversations with Anscombe, in which „she‟d propound some 
topic, and, and though she hardly ever agreed with what I said, she was always willing to 
consider my objection, and to wonder why I had made it.‟6 
 In her recollections of those times, particularly of her return to Oxford after 
World War II, she points to the revelations of the concentration camps and other 
unprecedented acts of evil in the war as an incentive to get involved in moral philosophy 
in particular, even though she had been more interested in the philosophy of mind. It 
began to sound rather hollow when she read Ayer, Stevenson and Hare claiming that 
„good‟ and „evil‟ were merely expressions of „emotion‟ or „attitude‟ rather than objective 
judgements on human actions. 
 On a number of occasions she has spoken of the spur which she received from 
the horrific photographs and films of concentration camps came out in the forties: 
 [I]t‟s really not possible to convey to people who are younger what it was like. 
One would have said such a thing on such a scale could not happen, human 
beings couldn‟t do this. That was what was behind my refusing to accept 
subjectivism even when I couldn‟t see any way out. It took a long time and it was 
only in the last fifteen or twenty years that I managed it. But I was certain that it 
could not be right that the Nazis were convinced and that there was no way that 
they were wrong. It just could not be… 
That is what has driven all my moral philosophy.7 
Aquinas, Aristotle and the virtues 
The way to objectivism in moral theory came when Anscombe suggested that she read 
                                                 
3 John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, 33.  
4„The Grammar of Goodness‟, interview with Alex Voorhoeve in The Harvard Review of Philosophy XI (2003), 
p. 34. 
5 The Owl of Minerva (London: Routledge, 2006) 
6  „The Grammar of Goodness‟, interview with Alex Voorhoeve in The Harvard Review of Philosophy XI 
(2003), p. 34. 
7 „The Natural‟, Interview with Julian Baggini in The Philosophers’ Magazine, issue 21 2003, p. 43. 
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Aquinas, and this brought her to the Second Part of the Summa Theologica, dealing with 
specific virtues and vices, later reflected in her Virtues and Vices (1978).8 She found that 
„the Summa Theologica is one of the best sources we have for moral philosophy, and 
moreover that St Thomas‟s ethical writings are as useful to the atheist [Foot has always 
declared herself to be a „card-carrying atheist‟] as to the Catholic or other Christian 
believer‟.9  This brought her to say that there are good reasons, not just to say that 
behaviour is vicious or virtuous in general, but that specifically, particular virtues and 
vices connect with key aspects of human welfare, and human appetite as controllable by 
will is probably involved.  
 This means all of the main virtues, however, as traditional thinkers believed. In 
Natural Goodness, Foot complains that most philosophers in modern times see their 
subject as having to do exclusively with the virtue of justice:  
[R]elations between individuals or between an individual and society, and so with 
such things as obligations, duties, and charitable acts. It is for this reason that, of 
the four ancient cardinal virtues of justice, courage, temperance and wisdom, only 
the first now seems to belong wholly to „morality‟. The other three virtues are 
recognised as necessary for the practice of „morality‟ but are now thought of has 
having part of their exercise outside „morality‟ in „self-regarding‟ pursuits, „moral‟ 
and prudential considerations being contrasted in a way that was alien to Plato or 
Aristotle.10 
 
 Foot believes that when we speak of courage, temperance and wisdom we are 
making evaluations of the rational human will also, just as surely as when we speak of 
matters of justice. She claims that folly, obstinacy and rashness, not to mention 
churlishness, ingratitude and despair can also deserve classification as „wicked‟ or „evil‟ 
even though no-one else is hurt by them.    
 This is the approach of all of her work, right down to Natural Goodness (2001), in 
which she situates morality within a theory of natural norms and species-based criteria of 
evaluation, as well as bringing to a new level her account of practical rationality which 
shows that human choice is based on i) rational grounds („acting on a reason‟) rather than 
causal antecedents à la Hume, whom she often criticises in this regard, and ii) a 
description of properly human goodness and happiness. 
 
Objectivism in ethics 
What is Philippa Foot trying to achieve? She tells us, at the beginning of her key work, 
the culmination of her thought, Natural Goodness:  
I have in this book the overt aim of setting out a view of moral judgement very 
different from that of most moral philosophers writing today. For I believe that 
evaluations of human will and action share a conceptual structure with 
evaluations of characteristics and operations of other living things, and can only 
be understood in these terms. I want to show moral evil as „a kind of natural 
defect‟.11  
 This is a far cry from G.E. Moore‟s anti-naturalism and from the subjectivism of 
Hare, Ayer and Stevenson. The latter had felt that they could now identify Moore‟s  
strange „non-natural‟ qualities among which „good‟ and „evil‟ were to be found: they were 
simply „attitudes‟ (emotional, expressive, or prescriptive) of the speaker, and reflected his 
or her commitment and views rather than a description of the event, person or action 
                                                 
8 Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978). 
9 Ibid., p. 2. 
10 Natural Goodness, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 68. 
11 Ibid., p. 5. 
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referred to.  
 According to Foot, subjectivism in values means that the making of a sincere 
moral judgement requires the presence of individual feeling, and goes beyond description 
or assertion of fact, in such a way that the descriptive content of moral-sounding words 
never reached all the way to moral evaluation – the speaker‟s emotion or command to 
action would always need to be added. Someone convinced of the utility of certain kinds 
of action would not – indeed could not – straightforwardly make the judgement about 
their moral goodness unless he found in himself the right feelings and attitudes, or was 
ready to take the step of committing himself to act in a particular way. Fact had been 
clearly distinguished from value, is from ought.12  
 In this connection, Foot recounts an exchange she had with Elizabeth Anscombe 
in one of their early philosophical lunches. She had remarked of some sentence that it 
must have a mix of descriptive (factual) and evaluative meaning. „And [Anscombe] said: 
„Of what? what?‟ And I thought, “my God, so one doesn‟t have to accept that distinction! 
One can say what?”‟13  This was crucial for Foot, and became a key question in her 
thought. 
 In later years Foot would deal with this, in her 1995 lecture: „Does Moral 
Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?‟ she claimed that it is the mistake of „so construing what 
is “special” about moral judgements that the grounds of a moral judgement do not reach 
all the way to it‟.14 Whatever factual grounds have been given, the person may not be 
ready to make the moral judgement because he or she has not got the attitude, feeling or 
conation which would be commensurate with such a judgement.  
 Why is this „non-cognitivism‟ so prevalent? In an early essay on Hume on moral 
judgement she points to his definition of morality as essentially practical, serving to 
produce or prevent action. She quotes from the Treatise:   
Take any action allowed to be vicious: wilful murder for instance. Examine it in 
all its lights, and see if you can find in that matter of fact, or real existence, which 
you call vice. In whichever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, 
volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice 
entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You can never find it, till 
you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of 
disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. here is a matter of fact; 
but „tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object.15  
 
 Reason is useless in this connection; it is „calm and indolent‟ for Hume: between 
these calm and indolent judgements and the assertion that something should be done, 
there is, for Hume, the famous gap between is and ought.  
 Foot believes that theories based on this gap are traceable back to an interpretation 
of Hume‟s „crucial‟ (and correct) premise: morality is necessarily practical. This can lead 
one to too close a connection between moral judgment and the will of the person 
judging, rather than focusing on the goods which the person has identified in the 
situation or action being assessed: 
[M]oral virtues are qualities necessary if men are to get on well in [the] world 
…This general connexion between such things as courage, temperance, and 
justice and human good is quite enough to explain why people are often 
influenced by considerations of morality. They are not necessarily influenced, as 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 8. 
13 „The Grammar of Goodness‟, interview with Alex Voorhoeve in The Harvard Review of Philosophy XI 
(2003), p. 34. 
14„Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?‟ in Moral Dilemmas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 192. 
15 A Treatise of Human Nature, II I 2, cit. in „Hume and Moral Judgement‟, in Virtues and Vices. p. 77. 
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Hume must have known; but they are concerned to teach and practise virtue in 
so far as they have taken this thought for their own and the common good. It is 
therefore unnecessary to posit a special sentiment to explain why observations 
about virtue have an influence on will, and the raison d’être of Hume‟s subjectivist 
theory of ethics disappears16 
 
Practical Rationality 
Philippa Foot says that Hume‟s demand for a practical morality is met by a most un-
Humean thought: that „acting morally is part of practical reasoning‟.17 It does not require 
some kind of introspective sentiment or desire on the subject‟s part. It simply means that 
we know how to do good things and want to do them. She quotes Aquinas here: 
„wisdom is a power under direction of the will‟. This is what adds up to the role of 
prudence in perfecting the practical intellect.18 
 So what makes a person morally say, just? For Foot, it is the fact that for him 
certain considerations count as reasons for action, and as reasons of a given weight. 
People who possess certain virtues possess them insofar as they recognise certain 
considerations, such as the fact of a promise or of a neighbour‟s need, or the helplessness 
of his or her child or aged relative, as powerful. The root notion, the common thread 
linking different parts of practical rationality is the goodness of the human beings in 
respect of their actions, which means goodness of the will, rather than simple gifts or 
skills of sight, dexterity or memory. Kant was right to say that moral goodness was 
goodness of the will; but he was wrong to think that an abstract idea of practical reason 
applicable to „rational beings‟ as such could take us all the way to anything like our own 
moral code. For the evaluation of human action depends also on essential features of 
specifically human life – educating children, helping those in need, telling the truth, 
practising chastity, etc. 
 Gavin Laurence adds that Foot‟s approach to practical rationality has been 
developing over the years. 19  In her early thinking, even when she had sloughed off 
Humean determinism in order to develop a theory of real and free practical rationality, 
prudence or practical rationality was still bound up with the agent‟s desires and interests, 
rather than with the practicable good – target of the traditional theory. 
 In the traditional theory, however, this is not enough: the mere fact that the end 
is desired by the agent is not sufficient for it to be a reason for him to act, either ever, or 
in these particular circumstances. Ends as well as means are assessable. Agents can make 
mistakes over their ends on this theory.20 The „formal object‟, as he puts it – the „point‟ of 
practical rationality – is the practicable good. He believes that this is the direction in 
which Foot has been moving with her notion of species-based „natural goodness‟. 
 Foot has been particularly influenced in this direction, away that is from the neo-
Humean approach, which still felt that the subject‟s desires were somehow the key, even 
if not in a determinist way, by Warren Quinn‟s question: what would be so important about 
practical rationality if that was all that it did? and, if it were simply the relation of means to 
ends, whatever the ends might be.  Why should practical rationality, with such a narrow 
focus, be able to dictate the terms of goodness? Reflecting on this, she realised that 
people take it for granted that practical rationality is not mere cunning, which is its 
caricature, but „has the status of a kind of master-virtue‟, always to be found when things 
                                                 
16 „Hume on Moral Judgement, p. 80.  
17 Natural Goodness, p. 9. 
18 „Virtues and Vices‟ in Virtues and Vices, p. 6, referring to Summa Theologica I-II q.56, 3. 
19 Gavin Lawrence, „The Rationality of Morality‟ in Virtues and Reasons, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
pp. 89-148.  
20 Gavin Lawrence, op. cit., p. 128. 
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like goodness and evil are involved.  
 This brought her to „the change of direction that Quinn suggested: seeing 
goodness as setting a necessary condition of practical rationality.‟ 21 Most people, she 
claims, reject a „present-desire‟ theory of reasons for action and judge that someone who 
knowingly puts (say) his future health at risk for a trivial pleasure is behaving foolishly, 
and therefore not well.‟22 
 This means that prudence, for Foot, is not simply a technical virtue for achieving 
our ends more ably, it is itself bound up with the end, with the good. As Herbert 
McCabe put it, it is much more importantly thinking what sort of action follows from the 
kind of person I am. To quote Aristotle, you have to have a character in order to make a 
decision, because how we interpret the world depends on the kind of person one is, the 
kind of virtues or vices you have developed.23 The induction which brings us to know the 
first principles of action would be mistaken without the experience which proceeds from 
the presence of virtue. 
 Foot remarks that this insight permitted Quinn to develop his  neo-Aristotelian 
account of human goods, and it certainly helped her to write Natural Goodness, in which 
we find that the life of our species and „Aristotelian necessities‟, like habitat, education of 
young, care for the old and vulnerable, play a part  in moral decision-making. Virtues 
such as chastity, temperance, courage find their fulfilment in the protection of goods 
such as these.  
Life [is] at the centre of my discussion, and the fact that a human action or 
disposition is good of its kind [is] taken to be simply a fact about a given feature 
of a certain kind of living thing.24 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre and practical rationality 
Alasdair MacIntyre, in a recent review article about Philippa Foot and Peter Geach,  has 
suggested that Philippa Foot‟s argument would gain by being pushed a little further. He 
is impressed (how could the author of Dependent Rational Animals not be?) by Foot‟s 
interest in species-based natural goodness, but he is not convinced that Foot has found 
the formula for identifying  what a natural good is, claiming that many of the virtues 
which she singles out are indeed good and productive of good but that it is „not proven‟ 
(as a Scot might say) that they are naturally so (and he instances the issue of making 
promises), leading to a situation that to judge an action personally immoral does not 
necessarily mean that it is naturally evil. 
 MacIntyre suggests a way out: change the definition of „goods-specific-to-human-
beings‟ by playing up the role of practical rationality, the specifically human quality of 
„acting for a reason‟. To say of something that it is „good‟ should mean simply that it gives 
some class of agents a reason for action. Nothing other than a good can do this: give us reasons 
for action. Since we are by our specific nature reason-givers, and reason evaluators, to act 
against reason or without considering adequately what reasons there are for acting, when 
one is capable of acting rationally, will certainly involve acting immorally, but it will, 
crucially, also be to suffer from a natural defect, for „by failing to accord with reason it 
exhibits defective humanity‟.25 
 
Conclusion 
For Philippa Foot, beyond all questions of perspective to be applied to human beings in 
                                                 
21 Natural Goodness, p. 63. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Herbert McCabe, „Teaching Morals‟, in God Still Matters (London: Continuum , 2003), p. 197. 
24  Natural Goodness, p. 5. 
25 Alasdair MacIntyre, „Virtues in Foot and Geach‟ in The Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002), 621-631. 
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differing circumstances and cultures, there are some basic human needs and goods, and 
the practical rationality involved in recognising and achieving the practical good is the 
place where virtue is found for human beings.  
 Returning to Fergus Kerr‟s assessment of analytic Thomism and its ability to 
reshape the agenda in ethics, alluding to Elizabeth Anscombe‟s starting point: 
 
[T]he project of getting the word „moral‟ out of ethical discourse and returning to 
something like Aristotle‟s account of what we call „virtue‟ as one kind of 
excellence among others was not advanced very far by Anscombe. It has been 







                                                 
26 Fergus Kerr, „Aquinas and Analytic Philosophy: Natural Allies?‟ in Aquinas in Dialogue, J. Fodor and F.C. 
Bauerschmidt eds. (Oxford: Blackwell 2004), p. 128. 
